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Introduction
Western legal texts often characterize law as an impartial discourse of reason that
regulates but stands apart from the messy reality of our social lives. On this view, legal
precepts operate in abstraction from the particular social and historical context within
which they developed.1 By contrast, socio-legal perspectives emphasize law’s inter-
action with the world of which it is a part, recognizing that law is both influenced by
and influences the social context within which it operates. Socio-legal perspectives also
attend to the embodied operation of the law—how it defines, corrals, and disciplines
human bodies. The embodied operation of the law is evident in many different arenas,
going well beyond the obvious case of criminal incarceration. Law, for example, regu-
lates access to abortion, shapes immigration, and polices public protests. In the
sporting context, law regulates the designated gender of athletes’ bodies.2
Using the lens of ritual, this dossier takes a socio-legal approach to examine the
performances, repetitions, and acts that express power and evoke emotional responses
amid the materially embodied and socially embedded operation of international
human rights law.3 Much intellectual energy has gone into discussing the history of
the concept of human rights, the elaboration of standards, the structure of human
rights institutions, and the difficulties of implementing and enforcing human rights
commitments. In this special issue, four human rights scholars draw on distinct disci-
plinary traditions in literary studies, history, anthropology, and law to explore how
international human rights law is enacted ritually. They demonstrate that rituals make
an important contribution to how human rights are institutionally and socially
embedded and experienced.
Anthropologists have long highlighted the significance of rituals, even character-
izing them as “the master-keys to understanding cultures, including our own.”4 Rituals
transmit social meanings and express community aspirations at the same time as they
embody and reify power relations. They are, in the words of S. J. Tambiah,
a culturally constructed system of symbolic communication. It is constituted of
patterned and ordered sequences of words and acts, often expressed in multiple
media, whose content and arrangement are characterized in varying degree by
formality (conventionality), stereotypy (rigidity), condensation (fusion), and
redundancy (repetition).5
Collective rituals are public, socially structuring events and modes of communication
that follow recognizable and predictable patterns.6 They operate in an affective
register: whether this is highly charged or muted and barely discernible, rituals
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communicate via symbols.7 Law is replete with ritual and its authority rests not only
on its putative legitimacy and ultimately on the fact that it can be coercively enforced
but also on how it is ritually enacted. Anyone who has watched an opening of
parliament, served on a jury, sat in a dock, or been called in court to rise for the entry
of the judges—traditionally garbed in gowns resembling clerical robes—has a sense of
this.8
If law generally is entrenched and authorized through rituals, human rights law—
which invokes an ideal human community and in its achievements constantly falls
short of its aspirations—relies particularly heavily on them. Adopted as universal stan-
dards and pronounced as such by all United Nations member states, human rights
now occupy a privileged position internationally and in many domestic settings as the
doctrinal expression of modernity’s secular religion.9 Human rights are articles of faith
that offer to the committed a just and harmonious world but never quite deliver on
their promises. Perhaps to compensate for this, as well as for the fractures in the
community whose normative aspirations they express, the textual articulation of
human rights and their performance in the UN bodies responsible for overseeing their
implementation is ceremonial and reiterative, conforming to scripts that are formulaic
and widely recognizable. We can imagine the uninitiated hearing for the first time
that “human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” or attending a
meeting of the Human Rights Council in “The Human Rights and Alliance of Civili-
zations Room” in the Palais des Nations in Geneva: without being inducted in the
intricacies of human rights or their oversight, they would know—or would feel—the
presence of ritual.10 Yet a ritual lens is rarely used in human rights scholarship.11
Our aim here is to bring to the fore the presence of rituals in the international law
of human rights. This engagement is open concerning whether or not rituals advance
the principles of freedom, equality, and dignity that human rights claim to promote.
Our starting point, and what motivates our interest, is that rituals transmit social
meanings at the same time as they embody power relations. This starting point draws
on a range of perspectives in the scholarship of ritual, including anthropologists’
insights into how ritual affirms or reaffirms participants’ sense of belonging to a
community. Communal experiences and shared motifs are constituted as such and
memorialized through rituals, forging social ties that are then ritually re-enacted. As
Emile Durkheim noted at the end of the nineteenth century, ritual makes it possible
for society to celebrate itself.12 Related to the role of ritual in strengthening social ties
is how rituals may be used to instigate new modes of communicating or indeed new
communities. This can happen in the aftermath of war or in recognition of deep social
divides, as transitional justice scholars have shown.13 In an illuminating study of rituals
of reconciliation in Sierra Leone, Tim Kelsall observes that “at its most effective,
[ritual] has the power to transform perceptions and emotions and therefore situa-
tions.”14 He notes that the reconciliation process in Sierra Leone “mask[ed] or
obscure[d] certain truths in favour of others”15 but suggests that this enabled the
reconstruction of community, albeit a community within which “the unbearable truth
of atrocities was partially eclipsed by the more palatable truth of remorse and desire
for peace.”16
Ritual thus provides a way of dealing with the fractured and ambivalent nature of
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social relations, lending coherence and structure to a world that might otherwise be
encountered as unbearably arbitrary.17 By enrolling participants in social perform-
ances, rituals not only canalize life and structure social relations but may also
circumvent the emergence of more coercive or violent forms of governance.18 Seligman
and his coauthors observe that rituals operate in the subjunctive mode, creating an “as
if” or “could be” world that itself constitutes a shared social reality.19 In their contribu-
tions to this issue, Shane Chalmers and Tobias Kelly engage with the importance of
this “as if” world within human rights rituals, and with the political significance of
the claim made by these rituals that human rights indeed exist and matter. Here we
can see a different and productive way of dealing with a staple anxiety in human rights
circles—that is, the gap between rights norms and rights implementation. By creating
an “as if” world, ritual brings that world into being. Once the ritual has come to a
close, participants may continue to act in a manner consistent with its construction.
The immediate impact of the creation of this “as if” world may be negligible, but its
implications and reverberations deserve attention.
Another approach to ritual focuses on its disciplinary character, paying attention
to ritual as a “script for regulating practice” and as “directed at the apt performance
of what is prescribed,” as Talal Asad puts it.20 This approach interests Zachary
Manfredi in his contribution to this issue. Manfredi’s essay focuses on the tribunal
established by Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre in the 1960s in order to determine
whether the United States’ involvement in Vietnam constituted genocide under inter-
national law. In Manfredi’s account, the Russell Tribunal inaugurated an alternative
vision of the role of international legal justice. Unlike contemporary international
criminal law—or Western law more generally—this vision does not rely on the
abstract impartiality of the law or on its coercive capacity to bolster its authority, even
as it nevertheless also makes use of ritual. The principle of legitimation that the Russell
Tribunal proposed for international law was that it secure peace and advance human
rights by acting in the service of the oppressed, “challeng[ing] the legitimacy of
powerful states to use arbitrary and wanton violence in pursuit of such peoples’ subju-
gation.”21
In common with the conventional operation of law, however, the Russell
Tribunal’s enactment of justice made extensive use of ritual. The Tribunal used
standard legal devices in relation to the presentation of witness testimony and
evidence, for example, and also in its express affirmation of the authority of its vision
of international law.22 Combined with its application of the label “genocide” to the
actions of the United States in Vietnam, this enabled its ritual function and its
capacity to elicit certain affective responses. Considering the affective and embodied
impact of the Tribunal on those who participated in or were exposed to its work,
Manfredi also analyzes the rituals of the Russell Tribunal, focusing on its operations
and judgement “as a kind of practice” “geared toward producing political ‘virtue’ in
its participants and onlookers.”23 Instead of attributing culpability for the violence of
the United States in Vietnam to specific individuals, the Tribunal, Manfredi argues,
made a much more powerful ascription of responsibility—holding the U.S.
government, and by implication its citizens, accountable “in terms of the historically
and socially conditioned ritualization of violence.”
PAGE 65
Authers, Charlesworth, Dembour, and Larking: Introduction 65
................. 19137$ $CH4 02-05-18 12:15:35 PS
PAGE 66
66 Humanity Spring 2018
The Russell Tribunal provides a model for subsequent efforts to institute alter-
native forms of accountability. Manfredi notes that there have been peoples’ tribunals
on human rights violations in Latin America, civil liberties in West Germany, the
military coup in Chile, the invasion of Iraq, and the Israeli occupation of Palestine.
He also identifies the founding of a “Permanent Peoples Tribunal on living wages” as
an expansion of international peoples’ tribunals into the arena of socioeconomic rights
violations.24 Other examples from 2015 that can be added to Manfredi’s list include
the Women’s Court that conducted hearings in Sarajevo, Bosnia, with women, repre-
senting all sides in the conflicts that engulfed the former Yugoslavia, testifying to their
experience and the harms they suffered; a tribunal conducted in Sydney, Australia, to
assess the accountability of members of Indonesia’s police and military for human
rights abuses in West Papua; and an International People’s Tribunal convened in the
Hague to consider responsibility for the 1965 massacres in Indonesia.25
Manfredi’s conclusion is that the Russell Tribunal and its progeny manifest a form
of international criminal and human rights law that affectively enrols participants,
with the result that “those who participate in the tribunals’ work come to embody a
commitment to holding powerful states accountable to the collective values of an
imagined humanity.”26 In addition to this, the role of such tribunals in publicizing
atrocities and analyzing and explaining the social, economic, and political conditions
that enable them operates—and here Manfredi invokes an expression used by
Derrida—to “sharpen . . . the vigilance of the citizens of the world.”27 Thought of in
this manner, what rituals achieve is to discipline participants and observers through a
modality of acting that is formal, reiterated, and, for most participants in the ritual,
externally dictated.28 This view of ritual resonates with the possibility that partici-
pation in human rights rituals can engender responsiveness to human rights values.
This could be their result, regardless of the commitment and sincerity of participants
to the proclaimed values.29
Taking as his object of study proceedings before the UN Committee Against
Torture, Tobias Kelly echoes this mediating role of rituals in his charting of the disso-
nance between country reviews and what participants believe the reviews should be
capable of achieving. If the seemingly bland politesse of meetings of the Committee
appears hypocritical to many bored participants, Kelly notes that the proceedings are
nonetheless symbolic not only of an aspirational belief that more must be done to
advance human rights but also of a world in which all states are equally accountable
for human rights failures:
The fact that all states, whether the United States or Togo, have to fill in the same
forms and answer the same questions in the same way, formally at least, is of great
significance . . . This is human rights operating in the subjunctive, a world of
“could be,” potential and hope, where it is possible to imagine that human rights
apply equally to the powerful and the powerless and speak a common language of
the collective good.30
For Kelly, rituals of civility force even the most bitter opponents to engage with one
another and thus to agree to differ without violence. Furthermore, in his account,
widely expressed dissatisfaction with the operations of the Committee Against
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Torture—the sense that it should be achieving more—demonstrates how rituals can
stimulate contestation as much as deaden it.31 Human rights not only provide a
common language; for some they also “speak of a world of moral and political possi-
bility that is greater than the mundane or brutal lived experience of the everyday.”32
The fact that this vision seems so elusive in the hearings of the Committee reveals its
latent power and the way that ritual always exceeds itself, gesturing to something
beyond each ritual instantiation. It should not be forgotten, however, that rituals
involve the performance of power relations, as Kelly emphasizes. For many scholars,
the true essence of ritual lies elsewhere than in the overt ritual action, which they
approach as a vessel that contains the “thing itself.”33 This perspective is productive
for looking behind the explicit commitments articulated in ritual performances in
order to question the worldview they enshrine. It reminds us that ritual performances
entrench certain practices and modes of thought, naturalizing and making them seem
self-evident through each repeated performance, and encourages consideration of ways
of thinking and being that are excluded or deprived of legitimacy by those rituals.
The rituals of the Committee Against Torture, then, facilitate a polite conversation
about human rights, but they also ensure that dissenting voices are constrained and
rendered less disruptive. Avenues are provided for civil society to contribute to the
work of the Committee, as they are for all of the Human Rights Council’s monitoring
mechanisms, but civil society’s engagement is formally mediated and requires facility
in the rituals of the system, including the practicalities of when, where, how, and in
what language to lodge “alternative” or “shadow” reports.34 Many NGOs that work
in close association with international human rights bodies offer training and assis-
tance to less experienced groups or individuals and shepherd their involvement. This
ensures greater access, but with the result that potentially unsettling interventions are
informally as well as formally mediated. Even where informal mediation breaks down,
the official modes of communicating and of policing what can be said generally
prevail. Kelly notes, for example, that NGOs have occasionally brought survivors of
torture to speak to the Committee Against Torture but that they have been received
with “a gentle reminder that ‘this is not the right space for survivors to talk.’ ”35
The international law scholar B. S. Chimni observes that “the existence of official
forums to protest the violation of human rights is supposed to negate the need for
‘unofficial’ resistance.”36 The operation of the official United Nations human rights
system may thus take the wind out of unofficial forms of resistance at the same time
as it ensures that the expression of resistance conforms to the structural presupposi-
tions on which the system is based. This means that attention is directed toward the
agency of sovereign states and potentially away from other actors, such as transnational
corporations, or from systemic influences, such as international trade and financial
regimes. Similarly, the gaze of participants is trained on individuals and minority
groups as the primary subjects of rights violations, and primarily on individuals as
possible beneficiaries of justice claims. It is potentially diverted from injustices that
have diffuse effects that are difficult to quantify, such as poverty and material
inequality, or the intergenerational impacts of climate change.
Each of the contributions here is interested in the implicit understandings and
political commitments that undergird rituals, ideas that can often be articulated
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through the relationship between ritual and ritualism. Ritualism constitutes one of the
five modes of individual adaptation to cultural values identified by the sociologist
Robert Merton, in a series which includes conformity, innovation, ritualism,
retreatism, and rebellion.37 It involves the formulaic or perfunctory acceptance of
norms or values in the absence of a more substantial commitment.38 Braithwaite et al.
understand the term as signifying an “acceptance of institutionalised means for
securing regulatory goals while losing all focus on achieving the goals or outcomes
themselves.”39 Where the concept of ritualism is related to that of ritual, it has distinct
and generally negative connotations. It involves rituals that are hollow or ineffective
and that lack vitality or resonance. Ritualism may also reflect and respond to “tension
between cultural values and goals . . . and a social structure that restricts access to the
approved means of reaching these goals.”40
Ritualism is a common response where the implementation of international
human rights standards is politically complex. While countries will engage with the
symbols of human rights, signing treaties, speaking to their human rights accomplish-
ments or challenges in international fora, they will do so in a manner that avoids
substantive change. Ritualism might, then, include reporting in a perfunctory manner
to international human rights bodies, or making minimal amendment of domestic
laws to remedy human rights breaches, or invoking claims of culture to undermine
international standards. To take one example, Cambodia accepted five human rights
treaties in 1992 under UN pressure.41 Yet it has managed to deflect the impact of these
human rights obligations through nonimplementation of its treaty commitments into
national law and its failure to report under the treaty system. The international
community has tacitly endorsed this ritualism, perhaps as the path of least resistance
in a political system that is inhospitable to human rights enforcement. The problem
is not confined to developing countries; indeed Australia is a party to seven of the
nine core UN human rights treaties and yet has been reluctant to fully implement
their provisions.42
Roland Burke, Chalmers, and Kelly all note the self-referential quality of human
rights—how each new textual iteration of rights repeats the pronouncements that have
come before. These recitations of a tradition of rights recognition, which serve as a
scaffold for any new rights, invariably also include the claim that the rights
pronounced exist already—that they are the birthright of all human beings (or
whatever subset of humanity is the focus of the instrument in question), and their
legal articulation merely recognizes this fact. This claim serves, however, to deal with
the reality that the rights, although they precede their announcement, are yet to be
recognized in fact. This means, in Chalmers’s reading of Joseph Slaughter, and of the
preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that human rights oscillate
“between the world that the law imagines, or images, in principle and the one that it
address in fact—between the ideal and the real.”43
One striking element of the ritualistic quality of international human rights law is
that certain phrases are now inextricably associated with rights. The major human
rights treaties refer to rights as “fundamental” and “inalienable,” and of the impor-
tance of rights as recognition of humans’ “innate dignity,” “freedom,” and “equality.”
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers as well to “the human family”
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constituted by human rights. Chalmers’s reading plays with the idea of the preamble
as a ritual passage, a “portal” to the Declaration’s provisions. The ritual form is
signaled not only by the text’s repetitive nature but also by its repeated positioning as
a transition between the human rights–violating past and a human rights–protecting
future. The resulting ritual movement constitutes the preamble as sitting at the
threshold of law, not completely a part of it nor quite beyond it, and yet integral to
the Declaration’s legal character. It operates, in Chalmers’s account, as “a rite of
passage”—one that must be gone through again and again in order “to make what we
should know also what we do know . . . in the spirited process of realizing human
rights.”44 This is a more sanguine reading of the way that international human rights
instruments endlessly recall the instruments that have come before without, however,
necessarily bearing any relation to the vision of human rights held by the drafters of
the Universal Declaration in 1948. In Roland Burke’s account this can reduce the
language of human rights to “shopworn prose,” incapable of communicating meaning
or holding power.45
Yet Chalmers makes clear that he is not engaging in a “redemptive turn” of the
sort that Ben Golder finds in much human rights critique, involving “a rethinking of
human rights in order to draw out a latent (radical) possibility or to formulate a
different kind of human rights.”46 In Chalmers’s account, ritual and ritualism coexist
in the assertion of human rights, whose purported universalism has “both constructive
and unconstructive” qualities.47 Through the constructive rituals of human rights, an
international dialogue becomes possible and also opens the way for diverse commu-
nities to “make human rights their own reality.”48 But because the normative claims
of human rights will always exceed the possibility of their universal enjoyment, their
ritual reiteration tends invariably toward ritualism. As Chalmers puts it, “Their real-
ization depends on a constant performance that makes the process ever-vulnerable to
ritualism.”49
In his examination of the Universal Declaration from a historical perspective,
Burke points out that, while use of the Declaration was initially minimal, this changed
in the 1970s as human rights language was deployed with increasing enthusiasm. As
Burke notes, however, this language was not articulated in service of a shared meaning
but rather marshaled to support various battles, including for national self-
determination, economic development, cultural particularism, and against apartheid.
Each of these battles claimed to be emancipatory and as such shared an affinity—
however minimal—with the vision of 1948, making it possible for those who entered
the fray to draw on the latent power of human rights language. In Burke’s account,
the result was paradoxical, “elevating [its] profile” “while compromising [its] legit-
imacy.”50 Burke claims that autocratic regimes were responsible for shaping an
inflationary human rights agenda within the UN, tied to struggles for national liber-
ation and economic development, as well as for legitimation of their systems of
government. Human rights came to serve as rather labored rhetorical flourishes in
myriad General Assembly resolutions, each talismanic recitation reiterated in subse-
quent resolutions, which would end eventually with a pithy statement of whatever
happened to be “the cause at hand.”51 The result of “the rites” of human rights, argues
Burke, was to dilute dramatically the potency of human rights.
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With its endless recitations of stock human rights phrases allied to disparate causes,
Burke concludes that “by the mid-1980s, the UN forum was almost a closed loop
system for the rearrangement of symbols,” “more hospitable to the skilful semiotician
than the overpassionate activist.”52 It was not until the 1990s, he argues, that “the
external reservoir of transnational mobilization on human rights, which flew slowly
and haphazardly into the UN, would replenish the language.”53 Even this activism,
however, would succumb—in Burke’s account—to “the seductions of ritual,” with
increasingly bureaucratic NGOs transitioning from “intense campaigning to
permanent advocacy.”54 Drawn through the mechanism of “the shadow report” into
the UN human rights system’s inner sanctum, civil society’s activism has been
moderated by its rituals, and as such their affective power and disruptive potential
constrained, as Kelly also noted. For Burke, most of the energy has been now been
drained out of the language of human rights, at least as it is employed at the UN:
“Rituals can keep the concept alive, and marginal. They almost certainly cannot make
it live.”55
Burke’s essay demonstrates how the same ritual—in this case, the invocation of
the language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—can be used by different
actors for different purposes, with political implications. And these ritualistic uses of
the language and symbols of rights were part of a procedural system that had itself
been deeply ritualistic. Burke points out that the individual complaints system for
rights violations established in 1947 consisted of the meticulous receipt and filing of
individual petitions, a procedure that invariably included an explanatory note that
there was no capacity to study the complaint’s substance. Complaints were thus quar-
antined from the purview of the Commission on Human Rights, a ritualism that
detached the system from meaningful consequences. Human rights rituals are not in
themselves inherently conservative; indeed they have may have transformative
potential. However the tendency toward ritualism is also an intrinsic part of their
character.
The concepts of ritual and ritualism emerge from different scholarly traditions,
but the four essays here suggest intellectually fruitful connections between them.
Drawing on Seligman et al.’s work that regards rituals as creating “as if” or “could be”
worlds, we can understand human rights rituals as requiring states to act as if they
take their human rights commitments seriously.56 Accepting a human rights treaty
requires a performance of implementation. While this may often be a ritualized
performance, there is some power inherent in the performative moment itself, as we
see in Kelly’s study of the UN Committee Against Torture. The power of performance
is also apparent in the processes of the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal
Periodic Review, where, despite political posturing by representatives of states pres-
enting accounts of their country’s human rights performance, and by delegates from
other states who assess and respond to these accounts, there are possibilities for
reflection and pressure.57
Attention to human rights rituals also presents opportunities for productive
disruption. Rituals can be subverted or appropriated for alternative ends, as Manfredi’s
account of the Russell-Sartre Tribunal and subsequent “peoples’ tribunals” demon-
strates. Rituals of human rights review can generate the belief that struggles for human
................. 19137$ $CH4 02-05-18 12:15:44 PS
rights are more than a series of localized conflicts.58 Because of the universalism of
rights language, and the participation of all states in international human rights insti-
tutions of one form or another, the role of these institutions cannot simply be
dismissed by authoritarian governments as illegitimate pressure.59 Civil society plays a
vital role in ensuring that the pressure of human rights review is more than merely
symbolic. While they are not immune to the dangers of ritualism, human rights orga-
nizations can help construct and maintain the “as if” world of commitments to human
rights standards, holding states to account for their commitments and drawing
attention to gaps between commitment and reality. This means that civil society can
be empowered by a country’s treaty ratification even in instances in which the
government fails to implement it.60
Rituals and ritualism coexist in human rights law, and rituals themselves can serve
multiple functions at the same time: they can be conservative, masking unequal power
relations, and yet also strengthen the protection of human rights. Attention to the
existence of ritual illuminates the ambivalent contributions of the international human
rights system.
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